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Abstract
Recently smoothing deep neural network based classifiers via
isotropic Gaussian perturbation is shown to be an effective
and scalable way to provide state-of-the-art probabilistic ro-
bustness guarantee against `2 norm bounded adversarial per-
turbations. However, how to train a good base classifier that
is accurate and robust when smoothed has not been fully in-
vestigated. In this work, we derive a new regularized risk, in
which the regularizer can adaptively encourage the accuracy
and robustness of the smoothed counterpart when training the
base classifier. It is computationally efficient and can be im-
plemented in parallel with other empirical defense methods.
We discuss how to implement it under both standard (non-
adversarial) and adversarial training scheme. At the same
time, we also design a new certification algorithm, which can
leverage the regularization effect to provide tighter robust-
ness lower bound that holds with high probability. Our ex-
tensive experimentation demonstrates the effectiveness of the
proposed training and certification approaches on CIFAR-10
and ImageNet datasets.
Introduction
Modern machine learning models such as deep neural net-
works have achieved a great success in a wide range of
tasks, but are shown to be brittle against adversarial at-
tacks. For instance, in image classification small perturba-
tions imperceptible to human eyes may largely deteriorate
the performance (Szegedy et al. 2013). Various heuristic
approaches are proposed to either attack the classifier or
defend adversarial attacks by making the classifier robust.
However, defenses that are empirically observed to be ro-
bust to specific types of attacks are later found vulnerable
to stronger or adaptive attacks (Carlini and Wagner 2017;
Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018; Uesato et al. 2018).
Therefore, achieving provable/certifiable robustness starts to
draw attention, in which the goal is to guarantee, determin-
istically or probabilistically, that no attacks within a certain
region will alter the prediction of a classifier.
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Recently, randomized smoothing is shown to be able to
provide instance-specific `2 robustness guarantees (Le´cuyer
et al. 2018; Li et al. 2018; Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter
2019). Specifically, given a base classifier, the prediction of
the smoothed classifier, defined as the most probable predic-
tion over random isotropic Gaussian perturbations, will not
change within an `2 ball whose radius may vary among dif-
ferent inputs. This guarantee does not require assumptions
on the base classifier, and is shown to be one of few methods
to provide non-trivial robustness guarantee for large scale
classification task like ImageNet.
Despite recent advances on the theoretical properties of
randomized smoothed classifier, how to train a good base
classifier that can achieve both good accuracy and robustness
when smoothed under this framework has not been fully in-
vestigated. The training procedures employed in most previ-
ous works did not fully take into account the ultimate goal
of achieving high accuracy and robustness when the trained
classifier is smoothed. On the other hand, since smoothed
classifiers based on neural networks cannot be evaluated ex-
actly (we will discuss the technical details later), in order to
provide robustness guarantee under this framework, a certi-
fication algorithm is required to give a lower bound of the
certified radius for each instance that will hold with high
probability. Nevertheless, how to certify the robustness of
smoothed classifiers is under-explored as well.
In this paper, we fill the aforementioned gaps and study
how to train and provide robustness certification for ran-
domized smoothed classifier. For training, we derive a reg-
ularized risk and discuss how to implement it for training
a good base classifier. Specifically, we propose ADRE, an
ADaptive Radius Enhancing regularizer, which penalizes
examples misclassified by the smoothed classifier while en-
courages the certified radius of correctly classified exam-
ples. This regularizer can be implemented efficiently and
applied in parallel with other adversarial defense meth-
ods. In particular, we discuss how ADRE regularization can
be extended to adversarial training scheme that has been
widely employed to improve adversarial robustness (Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016; Madry et al. 2017;
Salman et al. 2019). At the same time, we introduce T-
CERTIFY, a new certification algorithm to provide a tighter
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lower bound of the certified radius that holds with high
probability. This algorithm builds upon and extends previ-
ous certification approaches and can further improve the ro-
bustness guarantee. We assess the effectiveness of ADRE
and T-CERTIFY on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets, and
demonstrate that both approaches can improve the `2 robust-
ness of randomized smoothed classifier.
Related Work and Preliminary
Certified adversarial defenses Certified defenses aim to
provide robustness guarantee for classifiers. Specifically, for
a certain type of attack, we say a classifier is provable/cer-
tifiable robust within some region that may depend on the
input, if the outputs of the classifier is constant over this re-
gion. For the well studied `p norm bounded attacks, a variety
of methods based on techniques such as mixed integer lin-
ear programing (Lomuscio and Maganti 2017; Fischetti and
Jo 2017), satisfiability modulo theories (Katz et al. 2017;
Ehlers 2017; Huang et al. 2017), bounding local or global
Lipschitz constant of the neural network (Hein and An-
driushchenko 2017; Cisse et al. 2017; Tsuzuku, Sato, and
Sugiyama 2018; Anil, Lucas, and Grosse 2018), convex re-
laxation (Wong and Kolter 2017; Raghunathan, Steinhardt,
and Liang 2018) and many others have been proposed. How-
ever, these methods are generally unable to certify large net-
works, and thus cannot provide meaningful guarantees for
tasks like ImageNet classification, mainly due to the intrin-
sic computational burden or loose relaxation. Compared to
these methods, a salient advantage of randomized smoothed
classifier is that it circumvents additional assumptions on the
base classifier, and thus can fully leverage large expressive
neural network to generate a powerful smoothed classifier.
Notations and Randomized Smoothed Classifier Let D
denote the distribution of (x, y) ∈ Rd × [C] where [C] =
{1, . . . , C}. A soft classification function parameterized by
θ, F (x;θ) : Rd → [0, 1]C , maps the input to the probability
score for each class c ∈ [C], and the corresponding (hard)
classifier f(x;θ) : x → [C] outputs the class label with
the highest score. We use F c(x) to denote the probability
score with respect to class c. For neural network classifiers,
the probability scores are typically generated by the softmax
function.
Given a (base) classifier f , the smoothed classifier g based
on f under isotropic Gaussian perturbation with variance σ2
is defined as
g(x; f, σ) = arg max
c∈[C]
Gc(x; f, σ), (1)
where Gc(x; f, σ) = P(f(x + δ) = c) is the smoothed
probability score and δ ∼ N(0, σ2I). Throughout the pa-
per we simplify the notation by omitting the parameter θ
and/or σ, and use f, g to denote the base and smoothed
classifier, respectively. A nice property of g is that, for any
given x, g(x + γ) will yield the same prediction for all
‖γ‖2 ≤ R, where the certified radius R depends on the
top probability score pA = maxcGc(x) and the “runner
up” score pB = maxc6=g(x)Gc(x) (Le´cuyer et al. 2018;
Li et al. 2018; Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter 2019). With-
out further assumptions on f , the tight radius is
R =
σ
2
(Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)), (2)
where Φ−1 is the quantile function of standard Gaussian dis-
tribution (Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter 2019).
Training the Base Classifier To train the base classifier,
the most common approach was applying canonical empir-
ical risk minimization with a single draw of Gaussian noise
added on the training samples as a data augmentation pro-
cedure (Le´cuyer et al. 2018; Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter
2019). Stability training that penalizes the difference be-
tween the logits from original and Gaussian augmented ex-
ample was also proposed (Li et al. 2018). Very recently, ad-
versarial training was applied to significantly improve the
certified `2 robustness of randomized smoothed classifier
(Salman et al. 2019), where adding multiple Gaussian per-
turbation for a single training example was also employed.
In this paper, we formalize the idea of single and multiple
Gaussian augmentation as approximately minimizing a per-
turbed risk, based on which we derive the proposed ADRE
regularized risk. We further adapt adversarial training to our
regularized procedure and demonstrate through experiments
that ADRE regularizer is also effective in this case.
Robustness Certification The robustness radius for a
given example under the framework of randomized smooth-
ing requires identifying and evaluating pA and pB . Unfor-
tunately, for neural network based smoothed classifier, ex-
act evaluation is intractable. In practice, we can only give a
lower bound of the certified radius by estimating a lower and
upper bound for pA and pB , denoted by pA and pB , respec-
tively. Simultaneous confidence interval for multinomial dis-
tribution (Sison and Glaz 1995) was applied in (Li et al.
2018). However, from statistical perspective, without prior
knowledge about the true top and “runner-up” class, con-
structing confidence intervals for class probabilities is not
sufficient to provide rigorous robustness certification. An-
other approach named CERTIFY firstly estimates pA, and
then chooses pB = 1−pA, which can be loose in some cases
(Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter 2019). In particular, the pro-
posed ADRE regularizer encourages robustness by penal-
izing the “runner-up” probability for correctly classified ex-
amples, and thus this approach may not fully express the im-
proved robustness. In contrast, the proposed T-CERTIFY es-
timate pA and pB separately, and is shown to provide tighter
lower bound for the true certified radius.
While the radius in (2) holds for arbitrary base classi-
fier, under the framework of randomized smoothing we wish
to train a base classifier that can consistently make correct
predictions under isotropic Gaussian perturbation to achieve
high accuracy and large certified radius. Consequently, stan-
dard empirical risk minimization may not yield a desired
base classifier, since the original and perturbed samples can
be very different in high dimension, especially when σ is
large. Instead, consider the following perturbed risk
Rper(θ,D,P) = ED×P
[
L(F (x+ δ;θ), y)
]
= ED
[
EP
[
L(F (x+ δ;θ), y)
∣∣x.y]], (3)
where δ ∼ P is the perturbation distribution and L is some
loss function. Although P and L can be arbitrary, in this
paper we focus on P d= N(0, σ2I) independent of D and
cross entropy loss lCE(F (x), y) = − log(F y(x)). We write
for simplicity Rper(θ,D,P) = Rper(θ) without confusion.
Intuitively, minimizing (3) yields a classifier that has low
risk, and thus high accuracy under Gaussian perturbation.
Motivating Adaptive Radius Enhancing Regularization
The perturbed risk (3) tends to yield a randomized smoothed
classifier with high accuracy. However, the tradeoff between
robustness and accuracy has been widely observed, both em-
pirically and theoretically (Fawzi, Fawzi, and Frossard 2018;
Tsipras et al. 2019; Zhang et al. 2019). Meanwhile, al-
though Gaussian augmentation has also been observed to
yield a (base) classifier with improved robustness (Kannan,
Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018), it is not clear whether it
will generate a smoothed classifier with large certified ro-
bustness. In fact, without additional assumptions on the cur-
vature or complexity of the base classifier, it is difficult to
build a direct connection between the base and smoothed
classifier . Thus, the resulting base classifier from (3) may
still be suboptimal regarding robustness when smoothed.
It is clear that for any given input x, the certified radius di-
rectly depends on the top and “runner-up” probability score
of the smoothed classifier. Notice that for any fixed input x a
certified radius exists no matter g makes a correct prediction
or not. However, while a large radius when x is correctly
predicted is desired, a misclassified x with large radius is
detrimental. This motivates the following measure
Radre(θ) = ED
[
L′(G(x;θ), arg max
c6=y
Gc(x;θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(♠)
]
, (4)
whereL′ is some loss function. To interpret this, we consider
two cases
• when g makes a correct prediction, arg maxc 6=y G
c(x;θ)
is the “runner-up” class, and in this case (♠) serves as a
measure of robustness for the smoothed classifier, where
a larger value suggests a higher robustness.
• when g makes a wrong prediction, arg maxc 6=y G
c(x;θ)
is top class, and in this case (♠) corresponds to the radius
of a misclassified example, where a larger value indicates
a smaller radius.
Therefore, we can think of Radre as a balanced measure be-
tween accuracy and robustness for the smoothed classifier
g. For concreteness, in this paper we also choose L′ as the
cross entropy loss. Following this, we propose ADRE, an
ADaptive Radius Enhancing regularized risk
Rreg(θ) = Rper(θ)− λRadre(θ), (5)
where λ is a hyper-parameter. Here the first componentRper
corresponds to the classification accuracy of the base classi-
fier under perturbation. For the second component, we use
Radre as a regularization term that adaptively encourages
the certified radius and accuracy for the smoothed counter-
part of the trained base classifier. We call the training proce-
dure based on (5) as ADREREG.
Connection to Large Margin Training The goal of
achieving large certified radius for correctly classified exam-
ple is closely related to the objective of obtaining large mar-
gin classifier. Notice that R = σ2 (Φ
−1(pA) − Φ−1(pB)) ≥
φ · σ2 (pA − pB), where φ > 0 is the lower bound of the
derivative of Φ−1. From (4) we can see that Radre acts a
similar role as promoting Gy(x)−maxc6=y Gc(x), which is
equivalent to pA−pB when the smoothed classifier correctly
classify x. Therefore, the proposed ADRE regularizer can
be treated as a large margin regularizer under the framework
of randomized smoothing. Different from directly maximiz-
ing the margin of the trained classifier such as in (Ding et
al. 2018; Elsayed et al. 2018), we exploit Radre that is tai-
lored to randomized smoothed classifiers to guide the trained
base classifier in the direction of higher robustness when
smoothed.
Implementation Given training samples {(xi, yi)}ni=1, in
practice our objective naturally becomes to minimize
1
n
n∑
i=1
Li − λPi, (6)
where Li = EP [lCE(F (xi + δ;θ), yi)] and Pi =
lCE(G(xi;θ), arg maxc 6=y G
c(xi;θ)).
However, for a neural network base classifier, it is in-
tractable to evaluate both Li and G exactly, and thus we
will approximate both terms during training. Given a train-
ing pair (x′, y′), for the first term we use the unbiased esti-
mator
Lˆ(x′, y′;θ) =
1
k
k∑
j=1
lCE(F (x
′ + δj ;θ), y′). (7)
For the second term, we will substitute G by
Gˆ(x′;θ) =
1
k
k∑
j=1
F (x′ + δj ;θ). (8)
Essentially, for both terms we sample i.i.d Gaussian pertur-
bations and substitute the conditional expected loss and the
smoothed probability score by finite sample estimators. Note
that for G, we average over a finite sample of base classifier
probability scores F under perturbation instead of employ-
ing the fraction of counts, defined as
1
k
k∑
j=1
(
1{f(x′ + δij) = c}
)C
c=1
∈ [0, 1]C , (9)
where 1 is the indicator function. Although (9) is an unbi-
ased estimator for G(x′), due to computational constraint,
in practice k cannot be too large, which is problematic both
Algorithm 1 ADRE regularized Training
input : Training sample DN
parameter: variance σ > 0; tuning parameter λ ≥ 0; num-
ber of perturbations k > 0;
# for adversarial training
attack steps M ; step size α; radius ;
for each epoch do
for each minibatch {(xi, yi)}i∈[B] ⊂ DN do
δij
i.i.d∼ N(0, σ2), j ∈ [k]
if adversarial training then
for m = 1, . . . ,M do
Gˆi ← 1k
∑k
j=1 F (xi + δij ;θ)
xi ← PGD-step(xi, Gˆi, α, )
end
end
l
(i)
per ← 1k
∑k
j=1 Loss(F (xi + δij ;θ), yi)
Gˆi ← 1k
∑k
j=1 F (xi + δij ;θ)
yˆi ← arg maxc6=yi Gˆci
l
(i)
adre ← Loss(Gˆi, yˆi)
end
∇L = ∇ 1B
∑B
i=1
{
l
(i)
per − λl(i)adre
}
θ ← Step(θ,∇L) #update using proper optimizer
end
statistically and numerically, especially when the number of
classes is large. Instead, by applying (8) we implicitly con-
duct smoothing when estimating G(x′).
We can also justify (8) following G(x′) = (E[1(f(x′ +
δ) = c)])Cc=1 ≈ E[F (x′ + δ)].
The detailed training procedure is described in Algorithm
1. Notice that we use the same set of perturbations in both
lper and Gˆ. Empirically, we find this saves half of forward
pass computation without sacrificing accuracy and robust-
ness compared to the case where two different sets of per-
turbations are applied. Our implementation of ADREREG
also unifies and generalizes different Gaussian data augmen-
tation techniques applied in previous works when λ = 0
(Le´cuyer et al. 2018; Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter 2019;
Salman et al. 2019). We also note that Algorithm 1 uni-
fies the adversarial training scheme which will be discussed
later.
Alternative Formulations One may consider directly bal-
ancing off accuracy and robustness based on the following
objective
ED
[
E[lCE(F (x+ δ;θ), y)|x, y]
− λ′(Φ−1(max
c
Gc(x;θ))− Φ−1( max
c6=g(x;θ)
Gc(x;θ))
)]
,
(10)
where the first part stays the same, but the second part corre-
sponds to the expected certified radius. Although this looks
somewhat natural, empirically we observe that minimizing
this objective with plug-in approximation (8) is not stable
and may converge to bad local minima, especially when λ is
relatively large. This is reasonable since the second part of
(10) does not involve the correct label, and a classifier that
consistently makes wrong prediction with high confidence
can have low risk. Therefore, minimizing this objective can
easily converge to bad local minima with such property. We
speculate that more careful initialization may be required to
yield desired base classifier in this case.
Regularized Smoothed Adversarial Training Adversar-
ial training has been widely used to boost the robustness of
classifiers, and is arguably the most effective type of em-
pirical defense method against adversarial attacks (Kurakin,
Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016; Madry et al. 2017). Gener-
ally speaking, the objective can be formulated as minimizing
the worst case risk over an adversarial region with strength
, denoted by S
ED
[
max
x′∈S(x)
L(F (x′;θ), y)
]
. (11)
While adversarial training is typically used to improve em-
pirical robustness of classifiers, it is also recently found help-
ful to improve provable robustness for smoothed classifier
(Salman et al. 2019).
In this section, we describe an `2 attack scheme based on
ADRE regularization, which can be incorporated into train-
ing for obtaining robust smoothed classifier. Formally, given
(x0, y) we seek for an adversarial example
x˜ = max
‖x0−x′‖2≤
{
lCE(G(x
′;θ), y)
− λlCE(G(x′;θ), arg max
c 6=y
Gc(x′;θ))
}
. (12)
To be specific, instead of maximizing the standard cross en-
tropy loss of smoothed classifier lCE(G(x;θ), y), we maxi-
mize it together with ADRE regularization. To interpret this,
when we maximize over lCE(G(x;θ), y), we generate an
adversarial example with respect to the smoothed classifier
that leads to high loss and thus wrong prediction. In our sce-
nario, however, x˜ tends to be either 1) correctly classified but
non-robust or 2) misclassified, potentially by a large margin.
Therefore, the proposed attack is more versatile under the
framework of randomized smoothing, and potentially leads
to a smoothed classifier with a better balance between accu-
racy and robustness, when adversarial training based on this
attack is employed. The proposed attack is an extension of
the SMOOTHADV attack (Salman et al. 2019) when (12)
is implemented with plug-in estimate (8). We also note that
similar to SMOOTHADV we use lCE(G(x;θ), y) in (12)
instead of Eδ(F (x+ δ;θ)), where the latter one was found
to be ineffective in practice.
Since exact evaluation of the above maximization prob-
lem is intractable, we will follow the widely used iterative
first-order methods. For concreteness, in this paper we focus
on non-targeted `2 projected gradient descent (PGD) attack
(Madry et al. 2017), but other approaches can be applied as
well. Specifically, we approximate the inner maximizer by
iteratively solving
xt+1 = P2,
(
xt + α · ∇{lCE(Gˆ(xt;θ), y)
− λlCE(Gˆ(xt;θ), arg max
c6=y
Gˆc(xt;θ))}
)
. (13)
where P2, is the projection operator into an `2 ball with
radius  and α is the step size.
The detailed implementation of the proposed adversar-
ial training based on the above PGD attack, referred as
ADREADV, is described in Algorithm 1 where the helper
function PGD(x, Gˆ, α, ) runs a single step of PGD itera-
tion (13). We also reuse the same set of noise samples for
each training example at each PGD iteration to stabilize the
attack, as suggested in (Salman et al. 2019).
Robustness Certification
Certifying the robustness radius of a smoothed classifier g
for a given input x requires evaluating g exactly for pA and
pB . In practice, we may only estimate a lower bound pA and
an upper bound pB that hold with high probability. In this
section, we propose a Monte Carlo algorithm that guarantees
a lower bound of the true certified robustness that holds with
probability greater than 1−α, where α is a pre-specified sig-
nificance level. This method independently estimates pA, pB
and thus can leverage the regularized smoothed classifier to
provide tighter robustness guarantee.
We now describe the certification procedure. Given a
base classifier f and input x, we firstly sample δi
i.i.d∼
N(0, σ2I) ∀ i ∈ [n] and then evaluate each f(x+ δi). Sup-
pose we get a sequence of ordered counts NˆR1 ≥ NˆR2 ≥
. . . ≥ NˆRC , where each Ri ∈ [C] is an ordered class label.
For a given significance level α and α′ ∈ [0, α], suppose for
now R1 = g(x). Consider
pA = sup
{
p
∣∣P(Bin(n, p) ≥ NˆR1) ≤ α′},
pB = inf
{
p
∣∣ C∑
j=2
P(Bin(n, p) ≤ NˆRj ) ≤ α− α′
}
, (14)
where the probability is over the binomial random vari-
able Bin(n, p) with n number of trials and success proba-
bility p. The lower bound of the top probability score pA is
given by the classic Clopper-Pearson method (Clopper and
Pearson 1934) with one-sided significance level α′. For the
upper bound, we generalize the Clopper-Pearson method to
construct a one-sided confidence interval for pB with sig-
nificance level α − α′, where pB is defined as its boundary
point.
Proposition 1. Following the certification procedure de-
scribed above. For any fix x, if the R1 = g(x) then with
probability greater than 1 − α, g(x + γ) = R1 ∀ ‖γ‖2 ≤
σ
2 (Φ
−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)).
Proof Sketch. Without loss of generality, suppose the top la-
bel R1 = 1. Write G(x) = (p1, p2, . . . , pC). It suffices to
show that
P(pA > p1 ∪ pB < max
c 6=1
pc) ≤ α. (15)
Based on the definitions in (14), we know P(pA > p1) ≤ α′.
On the other hand, write αc = P(Bin(n, pB) ≤ Nˆc), we
know
∑C
c=2 αc ≤ α− α′ and therefore
P(pB < max
c6=1
pc) ≤
C∑
c=2
P(pB < pc)
C∑
c=2
αc ≤ α− α′.
This completes the proof by applying a union bound.
Proposition 1 shows that, if we have knowledge about the
top class then pA, pB are proper bounds, and thus we can
estimate a lower bound for the certified radius that holds
with probability greater than 1 − α. To obtain a tighter
lower bound, we may maximize the radius σ2 (Φ
−1(pA) −
Φ−1(pB)) over α′ ∈ [0, α]. For practical implementation in
which the top class is unknown, we propose T-CERTIFY,
which extends CERTIFY (Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter
2019) to provide a tighter certified robustness for a given
input by estimating pA, pB separately and searching over a
grid of α′s. The algorithm is as follows.
Algorithm 2 T-Certify
input : base classifier f , input x
parameter: variance σ, size n0, n > 0, significance α, grid
A
c0 ← SampleUnderNoise(f,x, n0, σ)
R1 ← top index in c0
c← SampleUnderNoise(f,x, n, σ)
for α′ ∈ A do
pA ←LowerConfBound(c[R1], n, 1− α′)
pB ← UpperConfBound(c[−R1], n, 1− (α− α′))
if pA > 0.5 then
rα′ ← σ2 (Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)).
else
rα′ ← 0.
end
end
if maxα′∈A rα′ > 0 return (R1,maxα′∈A rα′) else return
ABSTAIN
Here SampleUnderNoise(f,x, n, σ) samples the noise
δ′i ∀ i ∈ [n], evaluate f(x + δ′i) and get counts for each
class. Function LowerConfBound(c[R1], n, 1− α) calculate
pA following (14) based on the Clopper-Pearson confidence
interval (Clopper and Pearson 1934), and similarly for Up-
perConfBound. Similar to CERTIFY, T-CERTIFY abstains
from making a prediction when the lower bound at signifi-
cance level α′ is no larger than a half, which guarantees the
correctness of the top class prediction.
Theorem 1. If T-CERTIFY does not abstain and returns a
label c with radius r, then with probability at least 1 − α,
g(x+ γ) = c ∀ ‖γ‖2 ≤ r, where r is the returned radius in
T-CERTIFY.
Table 1: Certified top-1 accuracy on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet at various radii.
Method `2 Radius 0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.5 2.75 3.0
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
B
as
ic
σ = 0.12 0.81 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.25 0.75 0.60 0.43 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50 0.65 0.55 0.41 0.32 0.23 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 1.00 0.47 0.39 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02
A
D
R
E
R
E
G
σ = 0.12, λ = 0.1 0.83 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.12, λ = 0.2 0.85 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.12, λ = 0.3 0.83 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.25, λ = 0.1 0.78 0.64 0.50 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.25, λ = 0.2 0.74 0.60 0.48 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.25, λ = 0.3 0.73 0.62 0.49 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50, λ = 0.1 0.67 0.57 0.48 0.38 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50, λ = 0.2 0.65 0.57 0.47 0.35 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50, λ = 0.3 0.64 0.55 0.46 0.38 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 1.00, λ = 0.1 0.49 0.43 0.36 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02
σ = 1.00, λ = 0.2 0.48 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.02
σ = 1.00, λ = 0.3 0.47 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03
Im
ag
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et
B
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ic σ = 0.25 0.67 0.58 0.49 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50 0.57 0.52 0.46 0.42 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 1.00 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12
A
D
R
E
R
E
G
σ = 0.25, λ = 0.05 0.70 0.64 0.57 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.25, λ = 0.10 0.69 0.63 0.55 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50, λ = 0.05 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.46 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50, λ = 0.10 0.62 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 1.00, λ = 0.05 0.48 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.14
σ = 1.00, λ = 0.10 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.13
Proof Sketch. By Proposition 1 we know that with proba-
bility at least 1 − α pA ≤ p1 and pB ≥ maxc6=1 pc hold,
where again suppose without loss of generality R1 = 1.
On this event, since T-CERTIFY does not abstain only when
pA > 0.5, we know the top class is correctly predicted, i.e.,
g(x) = R1. This completes the proof.
Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of ADRE
regularization and T-CERTIFY algorithm for randomized
smoothed classifier. For the training procedure, we mainly
compare with the basic single Gaussian perturbation aug-
mented training, referred as Basic training(Cohen, Rosen-
feld, and Kolter 2019), and SMOOTHADV-ersarial training
(Salman et al. 2019), as these two approaches achieve state-
of-the-art `2 robustness under standard (non-adversarial)
and adversarial training scheme, respectively. For the cer-
tification algorithm, we mainly compare with CERTIFY.
To evaluate robustness, we focus on the approximate cer-
tified accuracy at radius r, defined as the fraction of samples
which are classified correctly by the certification algorithm
along with a certified radius being at least r. When com-
paring ADRE with other training methods, for direct com-
parison we only apply CERTIFY for robustness certification
with significance level α = 0.001 and number of samples
n0 = 100, n = 100, 000. This means that we use 100 Monte
Carlo samples to predict the output of smoothed classifier,
and 100, 000 to calculate a lower bound of certified radius
for each sample that will hold with probability being at least
99.9%. Note that the approximate certified accuracy is not
equivalent to the lower bound of the true accuracy that holds
with probability at least 1 − α over the randomness of the
CERTIFY algorithm, but the difference is negligible when
α is small. We refer the reader to (Cohen, Rosenfeld, and
Kolter 2019) for details. For T-CERTIFY, we search over
α = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0, where at α = 1.0 it returns the same
certified radius as in CERTIFY.
We firstly assess the performance of ADREREG and
ADREADV training. We run experiments on CIFAR-10
(Krizhevsky and others 2009) and ImageNet (Deng et al.
2009) datasets. Consistent to compared work, we employ
a 110-layer residual network and ResNet-50 as the base
classifier for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, respectively. For ad-
versarial training, we used a constant step size α = 2/M
with M being the number of attack iterations, and  being
the `2 attack radius. On CIFAR-10, we trained the classi-
fier using SGD on a single NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU. We
used a batch size of 400 with initial learning rate 0.1 which
drops by a factor of 10 every 50 epochs, in the total 150
epochs. On ImageNet, we trained the classifier on 4 NVIDIA
Tesla V100 GPU using synchronous SGD with batch size
256 when k = 1 and 64 when k = 4, where k is the
number of Gaussian perturbations for plug-in estimates. We
also used momentum (0.875), weight decay (1/32768), la-
bel smoothing (0.1) and cosine learning rate schedule for 50
epochs in total, where we set 0.1 · epoch/8 for warm-up and
0.05 · (1 + cos(pi · epoch/(50 − 8))) afterwards. For both
datasets, we trained the base classifier with random horizon-
tal flips and random crops. Similar to compared work, the
certified radii are with respect to original coordinate for di-
rect comparison. We also added a centering layer as the first
layer of the base classifier, which performed a channel-wise
standardization, as implemented in (Salman et al. 2019).
Table 1 reports the approximate top-1 certified accuracy
on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet comparing ADREREG and
Basic training. On CIFAR-10, we train the base classifier
with number of perturbations k = 8 and regularization
λ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} for different magnitude of perturbations
σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25, 0.50, 1.00}. On ImageNet, we train with
k = 1, λ ∈ {0.05, 0.1} for σ ∈ {0.25, 0.50, 1.00}. For a di-
rect comparison, we slightly change the implementation of
ADREREG training on CIFAR-10. Specifically, instead of
calculating l(i)per following (7) as described in Algorithm 1,
in this experiment we only randomly sample a single pertur-
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Figure 1: Certified accuracy of smoothed classifier trained with ADREADV (solid line) vs SMOOTHADV-ersarial (dashed line)
on (a) CIFAR-10 and (b) ImageNet.
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Figure 2: Certified accuracy of one representative base classifier certified by our T-CERTIFY (solid line) vs CERTIFY (dashed
line) on (a) CIFAR-10 and (b) ImageNet
bation for l(i)per, i.e., we let l
(i)
per = lCE(F (xi+δij ;θ), yi) for
a random index i ∈ [k]. By doing this, the only difference
between ADREREG and Basic training lies in ADRE reg-
ularization for both datasets. The results from Table 1 sug-
gests that ADRE regularization indeed improves the accu-
racy and robustness of smoothed classifier, where the certi-
fied robustness at zero radius is just the standard accuracy of
the smoothed classifier. In particular, with a proper hyper-
parameter λ, for each perturbation σ we can improve the
certified radius up to 9% on CIFAR-10 and 8% on ImageNet
without sacrificing the standard accuracy. We point out that
on ImageNet, there is little additional computation com-
pared to Basic training. We also run the original ADREREG
with k = 8 on CIFAR-10 and k = 4 for ImageNet. As is ex-
pected, we observe even stronger robustness at various radii
when the base classifier is smoothed.
In the next experiment, we compare SMOOTHADV-
ersarial and the proposed ADREADV training. For demon-
stration, we focus on 2-step PGD adversarial training on
CIFAR-10 with k = 8 and 1-step PGD on ImageNet with
k = 1. Figure 1 plots the approximate certified accuracy of
representative models on (a) CIFAR-10 and (b) ImageNet.
Each solid line depicts the certified accuracy of a model
trained by ADREADV and the dashed line depicts the cer-
tified accuracy of SMOOTHADV-ersarially trained model
with the same k and , in which multiple Gaussian pertur-
bation was applied for each training example on CIFAR-10.
The results from Figure 1 suggest that ADRE regularization
is also useful under adversarial training scheme.
Robustness Certification In this section, we evaluate the
effectiveness of T-CERTIFY algorithm. We use the same
α, n0 and n as applied in CERTIFY. When certifying a given
example x, we firstly generate a set of perturbations, and
then use the same set of perturbed inputs to estimate g(x)
and calculate the certified radius. This helps reduce uncer-
tainty when comparing two approaches.
Figure 2 depicts the certified accuracy from both ap-
proaches. We can observe that at each radius, T-CERTIFY
yields higher certified robustness. In addition, we notice that
the improvement gets more significant when σ is larger. This
is reasonable since with a larger perturbation, the confidence
of the smoothed classifier may become lower. In this case, it
becomes more important to estimate pA and pB separately
in order to provide tighter lower bound for certified radius.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a novel training procedure and
certification algorithm for randomized smoothed classifier.
We derived ADRE regularized risk and discussed how it
can be implemented in both standard and iterative first-
order adversarial training scheme. For certifying the (proba-
bilistic) robustness of a smoothed classifier, we introduced
T-CERTIFY to estimate lower bound for the `2 robust-
ness radius that will hold with high probability. We showed
through experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets
that ADRE regularization can improve the accuracy and `2
robustness of the smoothed classifier, whose base classi-
fier was trained under both standard and adversarial training
scheme. We also demonstrated that T-CERTIFY can further
improve the robustness guarantee based on the proposed reg-
ularization.
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